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Can the President and Congress Establish a Legislative 
Veto Mechanism for Jointly Drawing Down a Long and 
Controversial War? 
Charles Tiefer* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the simplest case: Congress declares war, and does not intrude on the 
President's solo decision about when the troops come home. I However, in 
our time, long wars, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, occur with great 
tension between the two elected branches of government over the pace of a 
drawdown. Sometimes it may be a hawkish Congress that disagrees with a 
President reluctant to continue the war at full troop levels. To find a joint 
way to draw down the American troops in the war zone, they may seek 
congressional mechanisms to resolve their differences with interactive 
processes. Then, constitutional issues arise as to whether a congressional 
mechanism may use a legislative veto - authorization for a drawdown with 
a reservation of power for a vote by the two Houses of Congress - so as to 
let the President draw down troop levels while reserving congressional 
power to stop that draw down. 
These issues illuminate war powers in the abstract; the issues also apply 
concretely to the main war of the 201Os, namely, the long war in 
Afghanistan. From 2012 on, the President has drawn down troop levels 
from their peak, matching the public's reluctance to stay at high levels. 
Yet, elements in the Congress may oppose, at some time, the pace of a very 
rapid drawdown, supporting relative aggressiveness because, among other 
reasons, they may be concerned that a very rapid drawdown means the 
Afghan government might falter. Existing scholarship does not focus on 
issues of reluctant Presidents and hawkish Congresses. In general, there is 
an undue one-sidedness in current scholarship, both about the potential for 
Presidents more warlike than Congress, and to the legitimacy of concurrent 
* Commissioner, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2008-
2011; Professor, University of Baltimore Law School. Further information on this statutorily 
created Commission and its televised hearings may be found on its website, www. 
wartimecontracting.org 
I. For general treatments of the subject, see STEPHEN Dycus ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY 
LAw (5th ed. 2011); LoUIS FISHER, PREsIDENTIAL WAR PoWER (2d ed. 2004); THOMAS M. 
FRANCK ET AL., FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
SIMULATIONS (3d ed. 2008); MICHAEL 1. GLENNON, CONS1ITUTlONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); LoUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 11-IE UNITED STATES CONS1ITUTlON (2d ed. 1997). 
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resolution mechanisms in bridging gaps between the President and the 
Congress. 
Take two speculative yet real-world paths. In the simpler case, 
Congress enacts, either in legislation based on enumerated constitutional 
powers or on appropriated spending laws, an insistence on threatening to 
slow down a drawdown. In the Afghan war, the President has started a 
relatively swifter troop drawdown from 2012 to the mid-201Os.2 If the 
developments in Afghanistan are unacceptable, a President reluctant to keep 
significant troop levels in the field may face aggressive figures in Congress, 
with support from military commanders, who consider it necessary not to 
let troop levels fall too rapidly.3 This raises a controversy about whether a 
"hawkish" congressional appropriation or enactment provision interferes 
unconstitutionally with the Commander in Chief s disposition of forces. 
The author has discussed the issues of a hawkish Congress and a reluctant 
President in a recent article.4 
In the more complex and interesting case, the r~luctant President is 
significantly interested in acting jointly with the Congress. He looks for a 
process, established in the form of a legislative mechanism, which 
compromises with the hawkish congressional opposition. That way, the 
opposition does not enact a more rigid, if simpler, provision that 
unconditionally slows down a rapid drawdown, thereby forcing an 
immediate, perhaps unnecessary, confrontation over congressional power. 
Instead, this lets future events on the ground decide what happens. 
So, he and the Congress use a statutory mechanism that is seen 
elsewhere in war powers.5 Congress votes freestanding enactments using 
its constitutionally enumerated war powers, or a condition on the year's 
defense appropriations, allowing drawdowns at a rapid pace for now. 
Rather, Congress includes in those laws a statutory mechanism that does 
2. See generally SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES: AMERICA'S WAR IN 
AFGHANISTAN (2009) [hereinafter JONES]; MICHAEL E. O'HANLON & HASSINA SHERJAN, 
TOUGHING IT OUT IN AFGHANISTAN (2010); 'AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE U.S. 
AND THE DISASTER IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA (2009) [hereinafter 
RASHID] 
3. As early as 2009-2010, President Obama drew his support for a surge of troops 
into Afghanistan from a coalition of Republicans and centrist Democrats, whereas the 
coalitions for virtually all his other controversial policies involved Democrats overcoming 
Republican opposition. For an overall treatment of President Obama's ambivalence about 
the large escalation in sending troops to Afghanistan, see BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA'S WARS 
(2010). 
4. See Charles Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President Step Up a War?, 71 LA. L. 
REV. 391 (2011) [hereinafter Tiefer, Stepping Up] 
5. See Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Legislative Vetoes in Foreign Affairs 
After Chadha, and of Requiring Congressional Assent Before First Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES? (Peter 
Raven-Hansen ed., 1987), reprinted in THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, 
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND SIMULATIONS 
728-732 (2d ed. 1993). 
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authorize the President to carry out, for the next year, his projected 
drawdown. However, that provision also states that the drawdown shall 
stop, upon a concurrent resolution of the House and Senate - that is, a vote 
of the two chambers not subject to presidential veto. So, a drawdown can 
go forward on the presidential schedule, but he has agreed to let the two 
Houses of Congress stop it. Although the legislative veto mechanism is not 
generally known to the public, this mechanism has definitely been used 
since the mid-twentieth century to balance broad initiations of war powers 
for the President with a channel for potential checks by Congress. 
Both sides may find common ground that drawdowns of troop strength 
in Afghanistan may be allowable if, but only if, capable of rethinking based 
on changing conditions as time goes by. So, Congress may authorize 
relatively rapid presidential drawdowns grudgingly on condition of 
Congress having power to conduct such rethinking, if the military 
commanders express alarm at developments in Afghanistan during the 
following months. 
Staying with this second case, suppose the reluctant President is 
disinclined to have a head-on clash with the hawkish Congress - in other 
words, for practical purposes, rather than force Congress to make good on 
its threat, he accepts it has power. He accepts that it could adopt 
freestanding legislation using enumerated powers, or an appropriation 
provision, not authorizing and in fact slowing down a projected drawdown. 
Instead, he avoids the head-on clash by signing into law a provision to 
authorize his projected drawdown subject to legislative veto by Congress -
with lingering suspicion on both sides yet a sigh of relief at balancing their 
disagreeing positions and moving forward jointly for the present.6 Before 
and after enactment, critics may say the mechanism violates INS v. Chadha? 
- the Supreme Court decision invalidating the legislative veto in a domestic 
context of powers delegated by Congress, not a war powers context. What 
does such a mechanism have in the way of constitutional support?8 
This analysis shines a new light on the constitutionality of mechanisms 
for the long wars in general (such as the Iraq war) as well as the Afghan war 
in particular. In recent years, wars have received analysis primarily just as 
to incidentals. Critics of controls on Presidents have developed their9 
6. For a sum-up of discussions of such a mechanism, see Daniel George, Note, That 
Is What We Said, But This Is What We Meant: Putting the Meaning Back into Use-oI-Force 
Legislation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 942, 959 n.103 (2010) (citing Jacob E. Gersen & Eric 
A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons/rom Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 578, 607-
608 (2008». 
7. Immigration and Naturalization Servo V. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
8. See generally Charles Tiefer, War Decisions In the Late 1990s by Partial 
Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. I (1999) [hereinafter Tiefer, War 
Decisions]. 
9. Note, Recapturing the War Power, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (2006). 
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positions lO on a range of war contexts I I in the "global war on terror.,,12 
These issues include commission trials,13 detention and interrogation 
14 d d . 15 treatment, an eaves roppmg. 
To understand the support for the President against congressional war 
powers (manifested in this article by a legislative veto mechanism), there is 
"a more pro-Executive approach," as Professor John C. Yoo noted, "such as 
the one promoted by scholars such as Robert Bork, Henry Monaghan, 
Eugene Rostow, Phillip Bobbitt, Robert Turner, and [Professor Yoo 
h· If] ,,16 S 17 f 'd . 118 19 h lmse .... upporters 0 stronger presl entia war powers, suc as 
Professors Y 00 and Sidak among many others, have drawn on overaU20 
sources
21 from the past.22 
10. CHARLES TIEFER, VEERING RIGHT: How THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SUBVERTS THE 
LA W FOR CONSER V A TIVE CAUSES (2004). 
II. David Gray Adler, George Bush and the Abuse of History: The Constitution and 
Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 75, 120-130 
(2007). 
12. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization 
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047 (2005); but see David Abramowitz, The 
President, the Congress and the Use of Force: Legal and Political Considerations in 
Authorizing Use of Force against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT'L LJ. 71 (2002) 
(discussing how actual compromise on the 9114/2001 resolution authorizing use of military 
force moderated presidential power; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001». 
13. Doran G. Arik, Note, The Tug of War: Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the 
Struggle to Balance National Security and Constitutional Values during the War on Terror, 
16 J.L. & POL'y 657 (2008). 
14. For general background, see, for example, Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005). 
15. Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: Congressional 
Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REV. 721 (2007); Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional 
Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1049 (2008); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES 
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf 
16. John C. Yoo, UN Wars, US War Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 355, 364 (2000) (citing 
works by each of the named figures). 
17. John C. Yoo, THE POWER OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The 
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996). 
18. See, e.g., Michael B. Mukasey, National Security and the Rule of Law, 32 HARV. 
J.L. & PuB. POL'y 831 (2009); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1639 (2002). 
19. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and 
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath. 92 MICH. L. REv. 1364 
(1994); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKEL.J. 27 (1991). 
20. Even the strong believers in presidential power would let Congress prevent or stop 
an intervention by denying it funding. See e.g., John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the 
Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA, L. REv. 1673 (2000). 
21. Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President's Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U. 
L. QUARTERLY 693 (1990); J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 
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However, there has been a one-sided neglecting of constitutional 
analysis about just what role a hawkish Congress may play in the core issue 
of the keeping up the troop levels in a war zone. For that matter, that has 
been insufficient analysis of a mechanism like a legislative veto, 
particularly after the recent actions Congress took - short of full signed-
into-law enactments, yet sometimes impactful nonetheless - as to the use of 
force in Kosovo in 1999, Iraq in 2007,23 and Libya in 2011 24 (although there 
have been some important articles in 2011-2012 about use of force in 
Libya).25 This article culminates a trilogy of articles by the author on such 
war powers issues newly raised by novel constitutional aspects of the Iraq 
and Afghan wars.26 
How realistic is it to analyze war situations beyond the commonplace 
example of Congress not authorizing, or stopping, hostilities? The author 
has developed this approach while serving as a Commissioner in 2008-2011 
on the federal Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 
established in 2008 by Congress.27 This Commission had about two dozen 
televised hearings, and issued interim and special reports. The 
Commission's work on wartime contracting addresses, inter alia, a practical 
understanding of the interactions between Congress, drawdowns, and the 
Afghan war. Also, the author performed congressional service related to 
war powers issues before that.28 
DUKE L.J. 1162 (1989). 
22. For example, Professor Sidak expounds how President Hayes in 1879 used his 
veto against appropriations bill riders forbidding the Army to protect black voters, Sidak, 
supra note 19, at 1218-1219. 
23. Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and 
the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447,467-470 (2011). 
24. Trevor W. Morrison, Forum and Response, Libya, "Hostilities," the Office of 
Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. FORUM 62 (2011). 
25. Note, Separation of Powers - War Powers Resolution - Abama Administration 
Argues that U.s. Military Action in Libya Does Not Constitute "Hostilities, ", 125 HARV. L. 
REv. 1546 (2012); John R. Crook, Note, u.s. Military Actions in Libya Raise Questions of 
Domestic Legal Authority; House Resolution Rebukes President for Noncompliance with 
War Powers Resolution, 124 AM. J. INT'L L. 574 (2011). 
26. See Tiefer, Stepping Up, supra note 4; Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders 
Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 291 (2006) [hereinafter Tiefer, 
Appropriation Riders -Iraq). 
27. Full information about the Commission is available at http://www. 
wartimecontracting.gov/. 
28. As Solicitor of the House of Representatives, the author personally represented the 
House of Representatives in a number of constitutional cases on national security. See, e.g., 
Am. Foreign Servo Ass'n V. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (vacating ruling striking down as 
unconstitutional a classified information provision in an appropriation bill), on remand, 732 
F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1990). The House brief addressed the constitutionality of the 
appropriation rider in that case, while also arguing the mootness issue which the Court 
accepted. The issues were nicely treated in Michael Glennon, Publish And Perish: 
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Part I looks at the first issue, as to a hawkish Congress outright stopping 
a draw down by legislation. This is different from the provisions, analyzed 
much more often, by which a Congress opposed to hostilities may deny the 
President the authorization to fight. Weighing the arguments, the better 
view surveys the diverse examples of history, and it treats, as valid, 
congressional enactments that stop a troop drawdown out of the war zone. 29 
Because some of the issues about a hawkish Congress's powers were 
developed in a previous article by the author, readers who want further 
treatment of the issues in Part I should look at that previous article.30 Such 
readers would be disappointed if seeking in Part III more treatment of the 
same issues about the reluctant President and the hawkish Congress as in 
Part I. 
Rather, Part II looks at the different question: May Congress take 
impactful steps by enacting a "concurrent resolution mechanism,,,31 with the 
President's support, for a potential later bicameral resolution stopping a 
drawdown - a mechanism the critics would call an unconstitutional 
"legislative veto"? 
Part II starts with the clash of functionalist and formalist approaches to 
separation of powers: the functionalism of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer32 vs. the formalism of Chadha. A close reading of Chadha shows it 
does not fully resolve the role of concurrent resolution mechanisms in war 
Congress's Effort To Snip Snepp, Before and AFSA, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 163 (1989). The 
author also served as Special Deputy Chief Counsel on the House Iran-Contra Committee. 
29. Impressive articles that shows congressional war powers far stronger than argued 
by those supporting the positions taken by President Bush include David J. Barron & Martin 
S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb - Framing the Problem, Doctrine, 
and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 756 n.201 (2008); Iules Lobel, 
Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the 
Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2008). 
30. Tiefer, Stepping Up, supra note 4. 
31. Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 
U. CHI. L. REv. 123, 187-188 (1994). 
32. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) [hereinafter 
Youngstown]. Iustice Iackson's "zone of twilight" analysis, see id. at 637 (Iackson, I., 
concurring), has been recognized in other contexts, like that of the 1995 Mexican peso 
bailout, as befitting the post-Cold War situation of Presidents who propose national security 
actions that elicit neither clear authorization nor clear prohibition from a Congress, and a 
public, ambivalent about foreign involvements. See, e.g., Russell Dean Covey, Adventures in 
the Zone of Twilight: Separation of Powers and National Economic Security in the Mexican 
Bailout, 105 YALE L.I. 1311 (1996); James D. Humphrey II, Note, Foreign Affairs Powers 
and "The First Crisis of the 21" Century": Congressional vs. Executive Authority and the 
Stabilization Plan for Mexico, 17 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 181 (1995). For recent treatments of the 
Bush administration's initiatives in light of Youngstown, see, for example, Kathryn L. 
Einspanier, Burlamaqui, the Constitution, and the Imperfect War on Terror, 96 GEO. L. I. 
985 (2008); Joseph C. Hansen, Murder and the Military Commissions: Prohibiting the 
Executive's Unauthorized Expansion of Jurisdiction, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1871 (2009); Mark D. 
Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View that Jackson's Concurrence Resolves the 
Relation Between Congress and the Commander in Chief, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1703 (2007).' 
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powers. Moreover, many academics concur that Chadha does not bar such 
mechanisms in war powers. 
Then, that Part builds the case for concurrent resolution mechanisms in 
war powers by going into the background, some of which is little-known, of 
such mechanisms. The best known such mechanism, Section 5(c) of the 
War Powers Resolution,33 enacted at the end of the Vietnam War,34 has been 
included in the extensive discussion of the War Powers Resolution.35 Some 
academics assume that Chadha must have rendered Section 5(c) of the War 
Powers Resolution invalid. However, Professor Abner S. Greene cites a 
number of eminent authorities to observe that "[t]here is fairly strong 
support in the literature for the constitutionality of [S]ection 5(c) of the War 
Powers Resolution, which requires that the President remove troops from 
hostilities pursuant to a concurrent resolution.,,36 Since his article, there 
have been yet more eminent authorities agreeing that Section 5( c) of the 
War Powers Resolution is constitutional.37 In brief, Chadha concerns 
domestic legislation delegating administrative powers to the executive, not 
the more fluid shared war powers. 
Moreover, the literature has failed to pay sufficient attention to how 
Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution followed many prior similar 
mechanisms, probably because there is no obvious trail leading back to 
these predecessor provisions, notwithstanding the provisions' importance.38 
33. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), 50 U.S.C. 
§§1541-1548 (2006). For current insight into the War Powers Resolution as a whole, see 
Michael J. Glennon, Comment, The War Powers Resolution, Once Again, 103 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 75 (2009). 
34. John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) 
Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1990); John Hart 
Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They 
Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1990). 
35. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993); 'Ronald D. Rotunda, 
The War Powers Act in Perspective, 2 MICH. L. & POL'y REv. 1 (1997); Cyrus L. Vance, 
Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. 
PA. L. REv. 79 (1984); Bennett C. Rushkoff, Note, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 
93 YALE L.J. 1330 (1984); Martin Wald, Note, The Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 
STAN. L. REv. 1407 (1984); Bobbitt, supra note 19; Note, Realism, Liberalism, and the War 
Powers Resolution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1989). 
36. Greene, supra note 31, at 193 n.259 (citing Stephen L. Carter, The 
Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REv. 101, 130-132 (1984); 
Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: 
A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 484-485 (1976); and John Hart Ely, Suppose 
Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379, 1395 (1988). 
37. See Tiefer, War Decisions, supra note 8,36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. at 30-31 nn.133-
135 (citing, inter alia, the 4th edition of Dycus ET AL, supra note 1, and Michael J. Glennon, 
The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74 
(1991». 
38. A rare current example is Robert Gray Bracknell, Real Facts, "Magic Language ", 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and Constitutional Authority To Commit Forces to War, 13 
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These provisions reveal the fundamental logic of such mechanisms: the two 
elected branches have much more flexibility as to war powers than as to 
domestic legislation delegating authority. And Presidents - including the 
reluctant Presidents - need a way to go ahead with war powers steps, 
including drawdowns, without denying Congress agreed-upon means for 
stopping those steps when the situation alters greatly. 
From another angle, in the past dozen or so years, the concept of potent 
actions by one or both Houses of Congress, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the 
War Powers Resolution or otherwise, has come into play repeatedly. An 
important congressional step occurred as to the Kosovo war of 1999.39 
Votes on important congressional steps occurred as to the Iraq War in 2007. 
Most recently, the House took significant votes as to the Libyan conflict in 
2011. These steps did not involve full invocation of a concurrent resolution 
mechanism, and a rigid formalist might blow them off as only illustrative of 
politics, not constitutional war powers. However, they should instead be 
seen as meaningful. They had compelling democratic legitimacy. They 
show the history of war powers virtually up to the minute, and to 
paraphrase what Oliver Wendell Holmes said, a page of history (about war 
powers) is worth a volume of logic.40 
Based on such past experience, there are different ways to 
conceptualize how a concurrent resolution mechanism works in war 
powers, different from the enactment process for congressionally 
enumerated powers or appropriations. Partly it comes from a kind of 
signaling in war powers not found in domestic delegation legislation. And, 
in the "democratic legitimacy" theory, the concurrent resolution has the 
democratic legitimacy that is proper to war powers decisions. 
Secondly, in the "anticipated next step" theory the President may read 
the provision as anticipating that a concurrent resolution, if flouted, will 
elicit a next step soon - perhaps with grievous rejection of prerogative for 
the President - in the form of strong provisions in Congress's subsequent 
legislation or defense appropriations that the drawdown shall stop.41 
The Conclusion treats how the issues for war powers analysis have 
changed from the classic ones to the new cutting-edge ones of the war in 
Afghanistan. It suggests the need for "suppleness" in war powers reasoning 
to keep up. 
NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 167,208-209 n.112 (2007). 
39. Michael Benjamin Weiner, Note, A Paper Tiger with Bite: A Defense of the War 
Powers Resolution, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 861, 889 (2007). 
40. N.Y. Trust CO. V. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
41. On confinnation in appropriations, see Note, Recapturing the War Power, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1820-1821 (2006). 
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I. BACKGROUND TO THE AFGHAN WAR 
In 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress adopted the 
authorization for force against the Taliban regime just three days after the 
attacks,42 without any way to foresee a full-scale counterinsurgency still 
facing a tough enemy in the next decade.43 In 2001-2002, the United States' 
striking victories chased the Taliban leadership out of power in 
Afghanistan, although the chance to capture them was missed. 44 At that 
date, a relatively limited American commitment could have rooted the base 
of the Taliban out, and made any comeback by them difficult if not 
impossible. 
This sequence that followed may be cited either by congressional 
hawks when they object to what they deem an overhasty troop drawdown, 
or by a reluctant President who says it is long overdue to draw down. 
Instead of blocking a Taliban comeback in the 2000s, the Bush 
administration instead initiated a policy called "light footprint.,,45 This 
meant deploying only about 8,000 troops who did not engage in 
peacekeeping. As Afghanistan expert Seth Jones writes, '''light footprint' . 
. . would prove to be a serious misstep that contributed to the collapse of 
governance in Afghanistan.,,46 Moreover, the shift in resources and 
attention from Afghanistan to Iraq grew irreversible, as the insurgency there 
got going from 2003 on, and deprived the Afghan war of the means of 
success. So, the Taliban came back.47 NA TO tried a "clear, hold, and 
build" strategy, but "low levels of troops made it virtually impossible to 
hold territory in Afghanistan'S violent south.,,48 The Bush administration 
continued to take away all the key resources for use in the Iraq war. As late 
as 2008, only 30,000 American troops were deployed in Afghanistan.49 As 
a result, the Taliban grew in area of involvement, armed strength, and levels 
of violence. They were seen as winning.50 
Under the Obama administration, a double infusion of troops took 
place. The military sought the forces needed for a counterinsurgency 
mission, with the goal of protecting the Afghan civilians to make the 
42. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
43. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke's Lengthening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect 
of War Without End, 2 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'y 53 (2006). 
44. JONES, supra note 2 at 97. 
45. [d. at 115. 
46. [d. 
47. Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense. Operation Enduring 
Freedom. and the Legality of u.s. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. 
REV. 77, 81-82 (2010). 
48. JONES, supra note 2, at 254. 
49. [d. at 301. 
50. See id. at 306. 
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country strong and secure enough for the Taliban to lose their hold. The 
President ordered a first infusion in spring 2009, fulfilling campaign 
promises to shift the focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. 
An intense debate broke out over a military proposal for a second 
infusion to occur mostly during 2010, especially for offensives in the south 
and east.51 Strong forces within the Obama administration opposed the 
enlarged commitment as did important figures in Congress. The 
"opposition" to the second infusion had become a core in the President's 
own party led by Vice President Joseph Biden, who had championed a 
different strategy called "counterterrorism-plus.,,52 On the other side, 
hawkish supporters of a strong commitment included some military 
commanders and the Republican Party in Congress, not yet in charge of 
either chamber as it was from 2011 on. The White House ordered this 
second commitment, but with statements about a drawdown to begin in 
2011 and to hand over completely the combat mission to the Afghans in 
2014.53 Consistent with that, the White House began anticipating 
substantial drawdowns in each year until the handing over of the combat 
mission. 
Thereafter, the tension lay between congressional (and military) 
"hawks" and the reluctant President. Senator John McCain led the 
congressional "hawks," reflecting his very substantial expertise and 
experience about war. The arguments on both sides foreshadow the 
arguments thereafter about a faster and larger drawdown vis-a.-vis a slower 
and smaller one. In 2010, the side favoring more of a drawdown54 argued 
that "[r]ather than investing so many of our resources in Afghanistan, we 
should pursue a comprehensive, global counterterrorism strategy.,,55 By 
2011, with troop levels having peaked, the side favoring more of a 
drawdown could argue from successes, such as reduced levels of violence 
in the country as a whole and a successful military effort against the Taliban 
51. WOODWARD, supra note 3, at 157-159. 
52. [d. at 159-160,234-236. 
53. Mark Landler & Helene Cooper, Obama To Announce Plans for Afghan Surge 
Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,2011, at Al3. 
54. A counterterrorism campaign, in this context, means using drones, special 
operations forces, and other specific resources to take down al Qaeda leaders, and perhaps 
some of the Taliban leadership. The Air Force may use bases in the country or may augment 
these as the war goes on by more reliance on neighboring countries. This strategy places 
maximum emphasis on training Afghan army and police for an earlier turnover from the 
American forces of the struggle with the Taliban. Counterterrorism means not necessarily 
keeping more regular military forces for fighting, beyond what the specific missions need to 
hit terrorist figures and what is needed to secure bases within Afghanistan for those missions 
and to keep the Taliban from taking over the country. See WOODWARD, supra note 3, at 234-
236. 
55. Press Release, Bipartisan Group of Legislators Writes President To Oppose 
Afghanistan Troop Increase, SEN. TOM HARKIN (Dec. 2. 2009), available at http://harkin. 
senate.gov/press/release.cfm?i=320378 (emphasis added). 
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strongholds in southern Afghanistan. Furthermore, those supporting such 
presidential reluctance could argue that the United States, with high level of 
debt and deficit inherited from the 2000s and a grueling recession, cannot 
afford the cost; that the large American cost, in killed and wounded, cannot 
be accepted; and that the American military cannot take the strain and 
distraction of this one long, large-scale war. In terms of local effects,56 they 
argue the war in the region acts to further destabilize, not bring stability.57 
Some argue that a larger commitment is unsustainable, and, so, will not 
persuade others we intend to sustain it, with their expectations of our 
eventual total departure working against US.58 
On the other hand, the hawks who might stop a drawdown could say 
that the announcement of a drawdown schedule itself undermines the 
American position, as the Afghan government and people, and neighboring 
states, treat us as short-termers and pay less heed to what we say or do.59 
By not making a premature drawdown, it may be that only a few more years 
of large military forces will be needed in Afghanistan, because of military 
successes by the American forces. 60 Conversely, signs of instability in 
Afghanistan may suggest going ahead with a drawdown might even 
threaten an Afghan government collapse. 
The issue is not which side is right as a matter of policy about the 
Afghan war. Rather, this illustrates why a President may be reluctant and a 
Congress may be hawkish. It also illustrates why they might both look for a 
compromise in the form of a concurrent resolution mechanism letting a 
drawdown proceed subject to being stopped by a concurrent resolution 
based on changing realities on the ground. 
II. WHY CONGRESS MAY STOP, OR THREATEN To STOP, A PROJECTED 
TRoop ORA WDOWN 
Much has been written about the more familiar type of Congress: the 
Congress that is less hawkish than an aggressive President and seeks to 
prevent or end wars. In contrast, comparatively little has been written about 
the Congress that is more hawkish than a reluctant President - a hawkish 
Congress that seeks to stop a drawdown. While there is less familiarity 
56. Material for all sides can be found in RASHID, supra note 2. 
57. [d. 
58. Robert Grenier, the former CIA station chief in Islamabad during the 2001 
invasion of Pakistan, testified at a 2009 Senate hearing, "What we are currently doing I 
believe is not sustainable either by us or by the Afghans." See Statement of Sen. Russell 
Feingold, Correcting the Myths in the Debate over Afghanistan, 10128/09 CONGo 
DOCUMENTS, 2009 WLNR 21527912 (Westlaw). 
59. DAVID KILCULLEN, THE ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA: FIGHTING SMALL WARS IN THE 
MIDST OF A BIG ONE (2009). 
60. O'Hanlon & Sherjan, supra note 2, at 74. 
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with the hawkish Congress, it is not an unknown phenomenon. Professor 
Sidak has summed up some major examples. 
Today, of course, we are so accustomed to thinking of Presidents as 
more hawkish than Congress that the hypothetical of a dovish 
President would strike many as preposterous. Yet, history provides 
a number of commonly ignored examples: John Adams resisted 
calls for a declaration of war against France in 1798 and instead 
sought authority for the limited and undeclared Quasi-War; James 
Madison was ambivalent about declaring war on Britain in 1812; 
Grover Cleveland in 1896 rebuffed the proposal by various 
members of Congress to declare war on Spain; William McKinley 
in 1898 reluctantly conceded to the same war fervor; and Woodrow 
Wilson successfully campaigned for reelection in 1916 on the 
slogan, "He kept us out of war.,,6J 
A recent pair of articles presents an enlightening treatment of 
Congress's powers of the particular powers of the kinds of uses of troops, 
such as their deployment or redeployment. Professor Saikrishna Prakash 
presents a comprehensive argument that Congress has an enumerated power 
to direct troop deployments;62 Professor Michael Ramsey critiques this 
position.63 Among other points, to show "Congress's power to escalate and 
de-escalate," meaning that "Congress not only can decide the type of war to 
be fought, but also can decide the level of force brought to bear in a war," 
Professor Prakash recounts the classic account of a hawkish Congress: 
"Congress gradually escalated the use of the armed forces against France 
[in 'the Naval War of 1798,].,,64 
Professor Prakash cites this in a full treatment of Congress's 
enumerated enactment powers, including its power to block deployments or 
de-escalate, from sources in the Constitution's text, formative influences 
such as English precedents, and early history. Notably, he argues that 
Congress has a number of enumerated constitutional powers, quite apart 
from spending control, to escalate or to de-escalate wars. These include the 
powers to raise and support armies, exercise exclusive legislation over 
military construction, regulate the armed forces and militia, regulate 
deployments, define the levels of uses of force and types of war, and set a 
war's objectives.65 
61. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE LJ. 27, 85-86 (1991) (footnotes 
omitted). 
62. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military 
Powers, 87 TEX. L. REv. 299 (2008). 
63. Michael D. Ramsey, Response: Directing Military Operations, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
SEE ALSO 29 (2009). 
64. Prakash, supra note 62, at 345. 
65. Id.at331-351. 
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A. The Issue of Form: Does It Truly "Condition" an Appropriation To Stop 
a Drawdown? Or Is It a Disguised Mandate To Spend? 
There is an issue, first, that Congress's war power via conditioning of 
appropriations, or legislation, has no relevance to stopping a drawdown, for 
reasons of form. To put it differently, for Congress to stop a drawdown 
may be a mandate that the President must use the forces Congress gives 
him, and, a mandate to spend the money - not a condition or negative on 
him. The usual issue raised in the context of war powers is whether 
Congress may preclude a war or other hostilities that involve an obvious 
outlay of expenditures for a new war the President intends, by a legislated 
negative on his authority or by providing that "none of the funds in this 
appropriation" may be used for such a war. So, as a matter of form, some 
might say that stopping a drawdown, in contrast to stopping a new war, 
does not so much bar the use of more forces or more funds, as mandate the 
use of forces or the spending of more funds to continue having the 
contemporaneous higher level of troops in the war zone. So, even if it is 
phrased in the negative ("none of the funds in this appropriation may be 
used for the projected drawdown"), it is, as a practical matter, a mandatory 
spending requirement (that is, its straightforwardly-structured form would 
be that "the President is mandated to use the forces and to spend the funds 
in this appropriation on keeping up the troop level"). 
This is not to argue (yet) about whether Congress is excessively 
interfering with the Commander in Chief. This is only about the issue of 
whether the condition is truly, in form, a negativing one. To put it 
differently, deciding the question of form leaves unresolved whether the 
condition invades the Commander-in-Chief power. A provision may be in 
negativing form, such as that the President could spend no funding "on 
Marine small-unit combat in Helmand Province" would properly be in 
negativing form but would nonetheless raise serious of Commander-in-
Chief issues. 
The provision is properly in negative form, as to, say, prohibiting a 
drawdown in Afghanistan (or, in 2007, in Iraq), because a drawdown is a 
new, vast, and distinct operation requiring new action and expenditure of 
freshly allocated billions of appropriated dollars for activity that differs 
from campaigning. The provision also does result, in the medium and long 
term, in less use of troops in the war zone and less spending. Still, in the 
next year, in form it negatives the new, vast, and distinct non-campaign 
actions and spending required for the drawdown operation. 
This author, as part of his Commission's work, was on missions in Iraq 
reviewing the drawdown in Iraq both before and during its progress in 
2009-2010, and was in Afghanistan during the period when a drawdown 
was being considered. Close familiarity with the activity of the Department 
of Defense in the war zone makes clear that a drawdown occurs as anew, 
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vast, and distinct operation, using separate congressional authorization66 and 
enormous newly allocated expenditures and huge numbers of both civilian 
and military personnel, separate from campaigns against the enemy. It is 
like the mirror image of the preparation for a war. A drawdown means both 
a new, vast, and distinct troop movement out of the country back to the 
United States (or elsewhere); equally important, it also means a gigantic -
and very costly - relocation, assessment, and refurbishment, termed "reset," 
of equipment and material; and it means a gigantic - and very costly -
project of altering, and decommissioning, costly bases, camps, and other 
facilities. It means extensive planning, tremendous contractor work, and 
costs billions of dollars to make the concomitant changes in bases, in fleets 
of military vehicles, in the equivalent of whole chains of arsenals and 
warehouses of materiel, and in the contractor support for all this. 
Although the drawdown presumably will, in the medium or long run, 
produce a net savings in operation costs because there will be fewer troops 
in the war zone, in the short term it uses new authority and is very costly in 
a new and distinct way. In any event the costs in the short term, and 
savings in the long term, are no more netted out in considering the form of a 
legislated enactment or an appropriation condition, than the potential long-
term gain from hiring a thousand new IRS agents would be n~tted out from 
the short-term hiring costs in deciding whether Congress could properly 
legislate against, or decline to appropriate, for the hiring. 
It is also irrelevant that in general the defense appropriation accounts 
used in wartime are provided as the very broadest and largest of line items 
in appropriation laws. Prohibitions work fine on matters that are within 
such large line items. Within the executive, the defense appropriations 
must be allocated, allotted, and sub-allotted so that the funds are there for 
the costs of each of the vast, new, and distinct aspects of the drawdown 
operation. As to form, Congress can legislate a prohibition or insert a 
condition to stop the draw down by negativing the tapping for the drawdown 
of such allocations and allotments. 
There is a related argument that stopping a drawdown is not a way a 
hawkish Congress can force a reluctant President to maintain the level of 
combat, because it leaves the President a backdoor option of reaching his 
de-escalation goal. The argument is that a reluctant President could undo 
the desired effect of maintaining the level of combat, because Congress 
may only prevent him from a drawdown of troops out of the war zone. The 
hawkish Congress would not be preventing him, as a matter of directing 
combat operations within Afghanistan, from taking the portion of troops 
marked for drawdown, and pulling them out of combat there. That is, he 
can make a kind of "internal draw down" within Afghanistan by which he 
66. The congressional defense authorization committees report an annual defense 
authorization bill. One would expect oversight, and specialized provisions, by the 
authorization law as to a drawback. 
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moves out of the front line a percent of troops that he had marked out to 
bring home, but for which Congress has negatived spending on the 
drawdown operation. While not drawing them out of the Afghan war zone, 
he would move them to Afghanistan bases away from the combat (roughly 
speaking, in the regions of the north and west of the country), and thereby 
reduce the level of troops engaged in fighting. 
This article does not evaluate this more extreme issue about whether 
Congress can regulate the President's power to make such an "internal 
drawdown" within the war zone as part of his powers to direct combat 
activity itself there. That presents the very separate question about what 
Congress may do as to combat arrangements, quite a different issue than 
whether, as a matter of form, a prohibition in legislation or an 
appropriations condition can negative the authorization or funding of a 
drawdown. Congress may take one step at a time, negativing a drawdown 
out of the war zone without grabbing for the Commander in Chief's tactical 
controls within the war zone. 
Also, it may merely be noted that as a practical matter, the President 
would face enormous pressure if a hawkish Congress were joined by the 
military commanders in the field and up the chain of command, all deeming 
it gravely wrong to warehouse passively a group of the troops that Congress 
has kept in Afghanistan anyway. The military should, and will, understand 
a national decision, thrashed out by the President and Congress, that the 
time has come to reduce our role in the Afghan war by drawing down, vel 
non, United States troops out of the country. But that is very different from 
their accepting that part of the Army in Afghanistan would stay passively 
and uselessly in an ill-chosen part of Afghanistan, sitting on its hands, 
neither fighting nor leaving, doing nothing but bum up taxpayer funds, and, 
although relatively nearby, not helping their fellow combat forces taking 
casualties at the front. It is that practical matter of what the military would 
tolerate as sensible within its sphere of war zone, more than legal 
arguments as to form, that limit the likelihood of Congress needing to deal 
with a President's "internal drawdown" that kept forces sitting passively in 
Afghanistan. 
This is absolutely not to say that all conditions on appropriations in war 
can be put properly in negativing form, or that the form resolves the 
constitutional Commander-in-Chief issues. Take a very serious stepping-up 
of a war, such as Congress directing that the army invade sanctuaries in 
neighboring Pakistan. Something superficially phrased as a negative 
condition, like "none of the funds in this appropriation shall be expended 
unless the Army goes into Pakistan" remains a disguised mandatory order 
of campaigning and expenditure. Unlike a drawdown-stopping condition, it 
does not achieve its objective by negativing a specifiable flow of funds to a 
new, vast, and distinct object. Unlike a drawdown, there would be no new, 
massive, and distinct expenditure just from the army not having the 
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condition laid upon it, and, instead, just staying put and continuing as 
before to stay in Afghanistan and to keep out of Pakistan. 
Rather, a hawkish Congress's condition that like "none of the funds in 
this appropriation shall be expended unless the Army goes into Pakistan" 
attempts to mandate the positive action and funding of new allotments and 
sub-allotments for the positive flow of funds, to achieve its newly sought 
object, namely, the invasion desired by the hawkish Congress. True, both 
stopping a drawdown and directing an invasion step up a war. But, as to 
which is in proper form as a negativing condition, the drawdown-stopper is 
properly in negativing form, and the invasion-orderer is not. It remains fair 
- and in fact, it is very important, and the right question, to ask - whether a 
hawkish Congress can stop a drawdown in light of presidential powers. To 
say the provision is in proper form does not at all answer whether a hawkish 
Congress can stop the drawdown planned by a reluctant President. But, at 
least it is in proper form for negativing appropriations. 
B. May Congress Stop a Drawdown in an Appropriation Provision? 
Just saying that, as a matter of form, Congress may put its stopping of a 
drawdown in terms of a statutory prohibition or appropriation condition 
only begins, rather than ends, the constitutional argument. Some who 
dispute that Congress may place their constitutional reliance on the 
President's general powers in what continues to be an authorized, legal war, 
particularly as to matters in the "active theater of war.,,67 The author's recent 
prior article treated the basic considerations of this issue and so, here, it 
need only be treated here relatively briefly. An analysis may group, 
loosely, those Commander-in-Chief concerns into three groupS:68 
command,69 disposition of forces, and military campaigns.70 In the 
67. Cf Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769-771 (2008) (discussing the Court's 
refusal to extend federal habeas corpus to aliens in occupied Germany in Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), given the possibility of judicial interference in military 
affairs); but see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 ("[T]hough 'theater of war' be an expanding 
concept [the Commander in Chief does not have] power as such to take possession of private 
property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production."). 
68. For a different way of evaluating the extent of infringement of a provision on the 
Commander-in-Chief issues, see Tiefer, Appropriation Riders - Iraq, supra note 26, at 320-
325. 
69. Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 61 
(1941) ("the President's responsibility as Commander in Chief embraces the authority to 
command and direct the armed forces in their immediate movements and operations"). In an 
apt distinction: 
Congress ... also has a distinct enumerated power to provide for armies and 
navies, and to prescribe the uses to be made for them. There is nothing 
inconsistent between this proposition and another one, which arises from a 
combined reading of the declaration of war clause and the President's power as 
Commander-in-Chief. This is the proposition that under those circumstances in 
which Congress has affirmatively embraced a commitment to belligerent activities 
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drawdown context, the President's relevant core concern consists of the 
disposition of forces, with effect on campaigning. This is the President's 
power, without legislative interference, to decide where to employ the 
armed forces in wartime - that is, whether they should be in the United 
States, or, in the war zone of Afghanistan. 
The clearest Supreme Court comment on this subject occurred in 
Fleming v. Page: 
As commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the 
movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his 
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most 
effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.7! 
For Congress to stop a drawdown derives strength from its past use of 
its potent powers to distinguish between authorized and non-authorized 
levels of war.72 A classic condition attaching to military appropriations 
occurred during the Indochina War in the 1970s that "none of the funds 
shall be used" for ground operations across the borders in Laos and 
Cambodia.73 Note the distinction Congress made between air and ground 
operations, a kind of distinction later made in a different form as to Kosovo 
in 1999 and Libya in 2011 - in effect, defining the level of combat by 
stopping the stepped-up (ground operations) level while letting the lesser 
(air operations) level go unchallenged. The Boland Amendments during 
President Reagan's proxy war against Nicaragua in the 1980s74 by Contras 
overseas on a sustained basis, it may not presume to dictate the minute strategy 
and tactics of the President's conduct of the authorized enterprise. 
Symposium, The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus Congress' War Power 
and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 46-47 (1988) (Prof. William Van 
Alstyne). 
70. Appropriations--Marine Corps--Service on Battleships, 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259, 
260-261 (1909) (upholding as constitutional a congressional provision that eight percent of 
detachments aboard naval vessels consist of Marines). 
71. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850). 
72. The potent "No Money" Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, c1. 7, 
provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law." The Framers placed this clause with, and worded it sternly 
like, the other emphatic interdicts in Art. I, §9, rather than with the general affirmative 
powers in Art. I, §IO. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427-428 
(1990). 
73. LOUIS FiSHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 142-143 (2d ed. 2004) 
74. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); Andrew W. Hayes, Note, The Boland 
Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1568-1569 (1988). 
This came after the disclosure of CIA involvement in mining Nicaraguan harbors. In 1982, 
the Boland Amendment to an appropriation disapproved of funding to groups involved with 
overthrowing the government of Nicaragua. See id. at 1567, 1567 nn.241-243. 
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illustrate Congress's flexibility in defining the level of wars75 in many 
respects.76 Again the Congressional specification did not just amount to 
setting an overall amount, but showing another kind of Congressional 
power both to de-escalate and to escalate. 
As noted, Professor Prakash has gathered numerous early authorities 
about Congress's power. The text and original understanding of the 
Constitution let Congress define the level of hostilities, including escalation 
and de-escalation. The author's previous article did so in detail for the past 
two centuries. These include specific examples of a hawkish Congress 
stepping up a war, such as stepping up the Naval War of 1798. Professor 
Prakash concludes, "rather than having a power to make a binary, one-time 
decision about whether to wage war, Congress may adjust the use of force 
. ,,77 
agamst an enemy. 
And, some particular examples show Congress specifying "hawkish" 
(albeit sometimes in a very loose and general sense) steps, during a conflict. 
Professor Lobel's work78 shows the hawkish (on this issue) "Radical 
Republican" Congress of the Civil War enacting legislation to push 
President Lincoln to a stepping-up as to the war zone. Notably, in the 
Second Confiscation Act, Congress legislated that the military would 
confiscate the property, and would free the slaves of rebels.79 The statute 
expressed the hawkish Congress's desire without delay to push further 
against the enemy in freeing slaves. By doing this too early, President 
Lincoln though this might embitter the South and even potentially alienate 
the border states. President Lincoln opposed what he considered the ill 
timing of the measure. 
75. With President Reagan's acceptance and non-disputation on constitutional grounds 
(however much he disagreed with the provisions as not supporting his policy enough), 
Congress made controlling dispositions, again and again, of the funding for personnel and 
material for the Contra war. As Special Deputy Chief Counsel on the House Iran-Contra 
Committee, the author co-authored the chapter in the committee report on the Boland 
Amendments. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
S. REP. No. 100-216; H.R. REP. No. 100-433 (1987). For previous writings drawing on such 
service, see CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY 119-136, ch. 6, "The 
Persian Gulf War Authorization," (1994); George W. Van Cleve & Charles Tiefer, 
Navigating the Shoals of "Use" Immunity and Secret International Enterprises in Major 
Congressional Investigations: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 Mo. L. REv. 43 (1990). 
76. Boland IV allowed some funding, and Boland V went further. Hayes, supra note 
74, at 1568 nn.253-255. Again, as with distinctions between "air" and "ground" war, the 
"humanitarian" aid prescription did not hold back funds in the Treasury. Rather, it enacted a 
control on operations in the war zone. Id. at 1569-1570. 
77. Prakash, supra note 62, at 347. 
78. Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: 
Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. LJ. 391,430-437 (2008). 
79. See An Act To Suppress Insurrection, To Punish Treason and Rebellion, To Seize 
and Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589-592 
(1862). 
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For a much-analyzed contemporary example, Congress debated with 
the Executive in the 1990s whether U.S. forces could take part in hostilities 
under United Nations command.80 The congressional insistence on 
dictating a non-United Nations command deeply intruded into the 
presidential direction of the chain of command.8 ) As it has turned out, 
Presidents have steered towards military alliance with the congressionally-
favored NATO, rather than a United Nations, structure, such as for 
Afghanistan starting in 2001 and Libya in 2011.82 In effect, the President 
was declining to dispute Congress's instruction. 
A provision for drawdown of the troops in a war - the Afghan war or 
other - touches on a concern of the Commander in Chief as to the 
disposition of forces, but does not amount to congressional dictation at that 
concern's core. Congress can stop a drawdown. Congress provides the 
authority and money for the troops to be in the war zone but not for a 
drawdown. Then, the Commander in Chief exercises his powers: he directs 
their command - by relations with the commanders - directs their 
disposition in the war zone - by giving orders as to where each unit will be 
- and, directs their campaigning - by giving orders about their engaging 
with the enemy. Congress is at a distance from all this, setting an overall 
level of hostilities, but as to everything finer-grained than that, not 
interfering. Further analysis of the issue of Part II may be found in the 
author's prior article on when a hawkish Congress may step up wars. 
III. ANALYZING A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION MECHANISM 
Now comes the other, more complex question about a compromise 
mechanism between the President and Congress: the validity of a 
concurrent resolution mechanism in war powers. In the course of exploring 
the roots of a concurrent resolution mechanism, this part looks into the 
little-known roots of the War Powers Resolution. This takes us back to 
World War II and later conflicts, including the Vietnam War. Then this 
part looks at the efforts to invoke the War Powers Resolution in 1999, 
during the start of the Kosovo-related NATO bombing campaign against 
Serbia, and in 2011, during the American participation in the NATO 
bombing of Libya. To put this in perspective, the section starts by 
suggesting why Chadha, although a decisive consideration in legislation 
delegating domestic administrative authority, is not so in war powers. 
80. Tiefer, Appropriation Riders -Iraq, supra note 25, at 320-321. 
81. Yoo, supra note 16, at 367. 
82. There were no United Nations forces in Libya, but there was a Security Council 
resolution, unlike Kosovo in 1999, which Russia vigorously opposed. See S.C. Res. 1973, 
U.N. Doc. SlRESI1973 (Mar. 17,2011) (authorizing no-fly zone over Libya). 
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A. Functionalism and Formalism; Chadha Revisited 
The functional arrangement of shared war powers means was most 
eloquently expounded by the greatest functionalist opinion on the subject, 
Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.83 
His concurring opinion subsequently received authoritative acceptance from 
the Supreme Court as a whole in Dames & Moore v. Regan.84 
Justice Jackson's opinion in Youngstown separated war actions that the 
President might propose into three categories: those clearly authorized by a 
law enacted by Congress, those clearly against such a Congressional 
enactment, and a middle category, the "zone of twilight: ,,85 
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority ... there is a zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical 
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.86 
Justice Jackson captures several functionalist themes about the nature 
of war powers in the "zone of twilight." His opinion identifies the war 
powers as an issue "in which [the President] and Congress may have 
concurrent authority.,,87 Moreover, Justice Jackson comments that legal 
conclusions about war powers exercised in this zone turn on "the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables." This Jacksonian 
approach did not use "contemporary factors" to dispense with what 
Congress had decided, but rather, its "three zones" analysis turned precisely 
upon what Congress had done and not done.88 Moreover, the approaches of 
83. The Court (speaking through Justice Black) found that President Truman did not 
have authority, during the Korean War, to seize the nation's steel mills in order to end a 
labor conflict. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579, 587-589; id. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
84. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654, 668-669 (1981). 
85. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-638 (Jackson, J., concurring). Dames & Moore 
restated the same concept by saying that most executive actions fall "along a spectrum 
running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition." 453 
U.S. at 669. 
86. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
87. Id. at 642-644. The image of a "zone of twilight" itself betokens transition 
between day and night, shading between light and dark, or, in other words, an area of in-
between-ness rather than a sharp division. 
88. Justice Jackson's description of "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence" 
reflects that Congress might have neither expressly authorized, nor expressly prohibited, a 
proposed action. Also, the Justices found there is still much to be learned from the exact 
record of congressional action, as Justices Jackson and Frankfurter examined concretely in 
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Justices Jackson and Frankfurter analyzed the nuances of a background 
consisting of a mixture: statutes with a pure delegation of authority; statutes 
with a delegation of authority subject to a legislative veto; and actions by 
Congress such as hearings.89 
Viewing Youngstown as a war powers decision invites consideration of 
the constitutionality of bicameral resolutions in war powers. Some may 
take it for granted that Justice Jackson could not be talking about how 
Congress acted - i.e., by bicameral resolution rather than by legislation 
signed by the President - but only the subject on which Congress acted or 
did not act - i.e., seizure of factories to end strikes. However, in context, 
Justice Jackson left this unclear. As discussed below, Justice Jackson's 
period in national legal affairs had been one of extraordinary fluidity and 
experimentalism in war powers before and during World War II, including 
the use of legislative veto mechanisms. The legislative background on 
factory seizures in World War II that received much focus in Youngstown 
included actions by one or both chambers of Congress not to move bills on 
the subject.90 While there are ways to frame such inaction within tight 
formalist perspectives, Justices Jackson and Frankfurter may have 
approached them more simply and naturally through their own functionalist 
perspective. They may have simply considered that inaction by one or both 
chambers of Congress was, in general, rather than in the interpretation of 
the meaning of a law, a relevant factor to consider, from a functionalist 
perspective, in the twilight zone of war powers. 
that case. See id. at 638-639 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 599-602 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
89. There are two tabular appendices of relevance in Justice Frankfurter's opinion: one 
is "Synoptic Analysis of Legislation Authorizing Seizure of Industrial Property," 343 U.S. at 
615-620, the other is "Summary of Seizures of Industrial Plants and Facilities by the 
President." [d. at 620-628. These include both statutes with a sharply limited (i.e., not 
approving the steel seizure) but pure delegation of authority, and the World War II statutes 
with a delegations of authority that are not pure delegations but are subject to a legislative 
veto. Discussion of these World War II statutes with legislative vetoes (listed in the 
Youngstown Appendices I and II) can be found in the Opinion of Justice White in Chadha, 
see infra note 95. For discussion of congressional hearings, see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 
607-608 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Consider the result if the record in Youngstown had consisted of a murkier interplay 
of statutory provisions and executive claims, with Congress much less definitively rejecting 
the power of seizure, but with as much or more significant legislative veto provisions and 
congressional steps such as hearings. This would have moved the analysis away from 
Justice Jackson's third zone, but still far from the first. In other words, the situation would 
have been in the second zone at its "border" near the third zone - the zone of concurrent 
powers, with Congress using legislative veto provisions and with votes by one chamber 
signaling some degree of congressional assertion of authority but not as absolute as a set of 
enactments purely rejecting the Executive action. 
90. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-586 (majority opinion); id. at 639 (Jackson, 1., 
concurring); id. at 599 n.2, 600-602, app. 615-629 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Against such fundamental Supreme Court decisions is the opinion 
firmly in opposition to legislative veto mechanisms, INS v. Chadha. 91 
Chadha invalidated a legislative veto in the immigration laws, a statutory 
provision by which Congress had delegated the Attorney General the power 
to cancel administrative stays of deportation for certain aliens, but each 
House of Congress could veto such stays.92 Chief Justice Burger's opinion 
applied to the realm of domestic delegations of power by legislation. The 
question is whether this applies to war powers, where there might be 
interaction by which Congress affected what the President does, not as a 
matter of domestic delegation, but as to more fluid, concurrent powers. 
This article accords Chadha much less control over war powers, using 
the author's particular experience. In the Supreme Court in Chadha, the 
decisive briefing occurred between the Justice Department, on one side, 
challenging the constitutionality of the provision in that case, and the 
United States Senate, providing the official defense on the other side. The 
author, in the Senate Legal Counsel's office wrote the draft of the key brief 
on the merits. Thirty pages of that Senate brief analyzed and systematized 
many scores of enacted legislative veto mechanisms, based on the author's 
review not merely of the statutes, but of their individual, extensive 
legislative histories in their individual, complex historical context.93 The 
indication that this briefing mattered more than most was that whole 
sections of the brief were lifted to form pieces of the monumental dissent by 
Justice White.94 And, nothing in the brief or the opinion by Justice White 
mattered more than the section on legislative vetoes in war powers. 
Part of the brief concerned the run-up to the War Powers Resolution's 
bicameral resolution mechanism.95 The run-up had come through the 
Korean War, the Middle East Crisis of 1957, and the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution in the Vietnam War. The details of this are below. What 
matters is that the brief put the War Powers Resolution's mechanism and its 
background before the Court. 
Two opinions apart from Chief Justice Burger's recognized the 
relevance of war powers and respected it. Justice Powell's concurrence 
struck the immigration mechanism but expressly shied away from the 
concurrent resolution mechanism in the War Powers Resolution.96 
91. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919. 
92. Id. at 957-959. 
93. Supplemental Brief on Reargument of the United States Senate, Apellee-
Petitioner, Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (Nos. 80-1832,80-2170,80-2171),1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1636 [hereinafter Senate Chadha brief]. The author is named on the brief, and was 
the chief drafter of the sections in question, under the invaluable supervision of the Senate 
Legal Counsel, Michael Davidson, and the Deputy Senate Legal Counsel, M. Elizabeth 
Culbreth, and with the help of the current Senate Legal Counsel, Morgan J. Frankel. 
94. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1003 (White, J., dissenting), app. 1 1003-1013. 
95. Senate Chadha brief, supra note 93, at *31-*39. 
96. "The legislative veto has been included in a wide variety of statutes, ranging from 
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Justice White laid out an appendix of "Statutes with Provisions 
Authorizing Congressional Review, consisting of "fifty-six statutes ... 
divided into six broad categories,,97 of which the first category was "foreign 
affairs and national security." The second such provision in that category 
was analyzed thus: 
War Powers Resolution ... Absent declaration of war, President 
may be directed by concurrent resolution to remove United States 
armed forces engaged in foreign hostilities.98 
In the text of the opinion, Justice White further explicated why he 
thought that mechanism crucial: 
During the 1970's the legislative veto was important in resolving a 
series of major constitutional disputes between the President and 
Congress over claims of the President to broad impoundment, war, 
and national emergency powers. The key provision of the War 
Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.c. §1544(c), authorizes the termination 
by concurrent resolution of the use of armed forces in hostilities.99 
In light of the pressure from two sides, the Senate advocates, and more 
importantly the concurring and dissenting Justices, especially Justice White, 
Chief Justice Burger shied away from the War Powers Resolution. In many 
respects, there is one enormous footnote of his opinion in which he gives as 
much of an answer as anywhere to those respectful of the War Powers 
Resolution. lOll He describes the veto repeatedly as inappropriate or 
unnecessary where Congress has delegated to the executive the power it 
exercises, by legislation, signed by the President and confined by the 
domestic non-delegation doctrine. lOl That is, of course, what Congress had 
done in Chadha itself, in which it delegated power to the Attorney General 
bills for executive reorganization to the War Powers Resolution. Whether the veto complies 
with the Presentment Clauses may well tum on the particular context in which it is exercised, 
and I would be hesitant to conclude that every veto is unconstitutional on the basis of the 
unusual example presented by this litigation." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 960 n.l (Powell, J., 
concurring in judgment) (internal citations omitted). Justice Powell's holding that the 
mechanism in Chadha was unconstitutional was based on his conclusion that Congress had 
"assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers." [d. at 960. 
97. Id. at 1003-1013 (White, J. dissenting) app. 1. 
98. Id. at 1003 (internal citations omitted). 
99. Id. at 970-971. 
100. Id. at 953 n.16 (majority opinion). 
101. Id. at 953 n.16, 954-955. The non-delegation doctrine does not apply in foreign 
relations the way it applies domestically. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 315-324 (1936). The Supreme Court strongly reconfirmed this distinction in 1998. 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 444-446 (1998). See Charles Tiefer, Congress in 
a Straitjacket?, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., June 29,1998, at 23, 24-25. 
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by legislation, signed by the President and confined by the domestic non-
delegation doctrine. 
However, war powers do not work the way the legislation that Chief 
Justice Burger discusses works. Congress did not enact a "War Law" 
pursuant to which the President periodically goes to war. Congress's share 
of war powers, and the President's share of war powers, are concurrent 
powers coming from diverse provisions of the Constitution, not from the 
simple uniform vehicle of delegation. Piecing together the validity of an 
exercise of war powers is not at all like piecing together what Chief Justice 
Burger said about domestic delegating legislation and the non-delegation 
doctrine. 102 Chief Justice Burger concludes: "Congress's authority to 
delegate portions of its power to administrative agencies provides no 
support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally control 
administration of the laws by way of a [c]ongressional veto.,,103 
This is not to say that Chief Justice Burger expressly separated the 
concurrent resolution in war powers from what he was discussing. It is 
merely to say that he focused on the non-war-powers context of delegating 
legislation in which his reasoning had its strongest support. He did not go 
anywhere near an explicit contest with either the Senate or, more important, 
Justice White, about concurrent war powers. It is worth looking at why war 
powers may be, and in fact are, a special context and subject, keeping 
Chadha in mind but not thinking that the subject is foreclosed by an opinion 
which very visibly declined to mention it or to reason about it. 
B. War Powers Resolution Section 5(c): Background'04 
The War Powers Resolution has several very important sections. Most 
attention goes to a provision not relevant here, the provision that limits how 
long a President may continue hostilities without congressional 
authorization. lOS This discussion focuses on the provision, Section 5(c), that 
created a concurrent resolution mechanism by which Congress, by a vote of 
the House and Senate (not presented to the President), may terminate 
American involvement in hostilities. '06 
102. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16. The footnote cites both Supreme Court and 
classic D.C. Circuit precedents, as well as commentary, all on the non-delegation doctrine. 
103. [d. 
104. Section S(c) has drawn extensive commentary. Most commentators have 
distinguished §5(c) from Chadha. However, the debate has been sprawling and loose 
enough that some who take it as unconstitutional appear quite unaware that others do not. 
The provision receives useful illuminations from study of its little-known yet striking 
background in thirty years of similar prior provisions. 
105. See 50 U.S.c. §1544(b) (2006). 
106. The provision is referred to as "Section S(c)" because in the War Powers 
Resolution itself, Pub. L. No. 93-148, (1973), the provision is found in Section S(c). It is 
codified at 50 U.S.C. § IS44(c). 
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In considering the War Powers Resolution, Congress expressly 
considered the constitutionality of the provision that became Section 5(c). 
The House bill had a provision for termination of conflicts by concurrent 
resolution;l07 the Senate bill did not. 108 The final version, in effect today, 
states: 109 
(c) Concurrent resolution for removal by President of United States 
Armed Forces 
Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, at any time that 
United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the 
territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without 
a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces 
shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by 
concurrent resolution. 
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Chadha discussed Section 5(c)'s 
roots in Congress's conditioning grants of power during World War II: 
World War II occasioned the need to transfer greater authority to 
the President in these areas. [With a legislative veto,] Congress 
could confer additional authority while preserving its own 
constitutional role. During World War II, Congress enacted over 
thirty statutes conferring powers on the executive with legislative 
veto provlSlons. President Roosevelt accepted the veto as the 
necessary price for obtaining exceptional authority.110 
After World War II, provisions with similar mechanisms III served 
crucial roles in legislation addressing the Truman Doctrine, the Korean 
War, the Middle East Crisis of 1957, and the Vietnam War. 112 For example, 
the original Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the authorization President Johnson 
obtained from Congress for the Vietnam War, had in it one of these 
provisions: 
This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that 
the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by 
international conditions created by action of the United Nations or 
107. H.R. REp. No. 93-287, at 2355 (1973). 
108. On the basis of an opinion of constitutionality from Professor Paul A. Freund, one 
of the leading scholars on this subject, the conference committee and the two chambers 
adopted the concurrent resolution mechanism. See H.R. CONF. REP. 93-547, at 2365 (1973). 
109. 50 V.S.c. §1544(c). 
110. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969 (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
111. BrackneIl, supra note 38, at 208 n.112. 
112. Senate Chadha brief, supra note 93, at *37, *37 n.44. 
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otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent 
resolution of the Congress. 113 
Justice White sums up well when he says "Congress could confer 
additional authority while preserving its own constitutional role," and "[the 
President] accepted the [legislative] veto as the necessary price for 
obtaining exceptional authority.,,114 
Usefully, Justice White's comments distinguish the concurrent 
resolution mechanisms in the Middle East crisis of 1957 and the Vietnam 
War from the many "legislative veto" provisions regarding domestic 
regulatory and energy actions. War powers are shared by the President and 
Congress, not separated like the powers of enactment (Congress) and 
delegated administration (executive). A mechanism like the one in the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution or the War Powers Resolution has nothing to do 
with the delegations in laws like regulatory or criminal provisions. Rather, 
it provides a flexible way Congress and the President share their concurrent 
war powers. 
Chadha had a radical impact on the diverse legislative veto 
mechanisms, but the impact varied in different areas. The enactment of 
legislative vetoes fell off in the areas of regulatory rulemaking. However, 
Louis Fisher, scholar at the Library of Congress, has counted many 
legislative veto-like mechanisms, described this way in the broadest sense, 
still on the books or newly enacted since Chadha. liS An important example 
is that Congress continues to allow agencies to shift appropriations from 
one purpose to another by procedures of reprogramming and the like. It is 
notable that much of this is remote from regulatory rulemaking or other 
court-supervised delegated authority. These involve a substantial 
involvement of congressional appropriations committees in deciding 
whether they favor the reprogramming. 
Congress continues mechanisms of diverse kinds in war powers that 
dovetail with the discussion about the Boland Amendments. As Fisher 
notes: 
Another type of informal arrangement is reflected in the "Baker 
Accord" of 1989. In the early months of the [George H. W. Bush] 
Administration, Secretary of State James A. Baker III decided to 
give four committees of Congress a veto power over the fractious 
issue of funding the Nicaraguan Contras .... In return for receiving 
1l3. Pub. L. No. 88-408, §3, 78 Stat. 384, (1964) [hereinafter Tonkin Gulf Resolution]. 
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was repealed by statute. By this time, President Nixon asserted 
powers that the repeal did not affect, such as approval of the war by voting its 
appropriations, and his own powers as Commander in Chief. 
114. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969 (White, 1., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
115. Louis Fisher, Committee Controls of Agency Decisions (Cong. Res. Service 
RL33151), Nov. 16,2005. 
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$50 million in humanitarian aid for the Contras, Baker reportedly 
agreed that a portion of the funds could be released only with the 
approval of certain committees and party leaders."6 
157 
Fisher traces how Congress considered repealing the concurrent 
resolution mechanism of Section 5(c), but instead merely supplemented it, 
without a repeal, by a separate provision for a joint resolution. I 17 
C. Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya 
1. Kosovo 
Beside the brief Persian Gulf War, the United States committed its 
armed forces into one major substantial conflict between the War Powers 
Resolution of 1974 and September 11, 2001. Namely, in 1995 the United 
States sent ground forces to keep peace in Bosnia, and then, more 
important, in 2000 engaged in a massive bombing campaign against Serbia 
to force an end to Serbia's actions against Kosovo. That makes this conflict 
the best to see the use of Section 5(c). 
To give an account in abbreviated chronology, in late 1995 President 
Clinton sought congressional support for a Bosnia deployment. He dropped 
his objection to $7 billion Congress wanted for defense beyond the budget, 
and the defense appropriation he needed for the deployment became law. 
Separately, after major debates on the commitment, the Senate voted 
support for the deployment. A strong majority of House Republicans 
opposed the deployment. Yet, at the key point, the House defeated a 
provision prohibiting funds for the deployment, by the close vote of 210-
218. Thus, although the votes of the Senate and House had not occurred by 
affirmation of a single vehicle as sought by Chadha, the President could, 
and did, take the votes in the realm of shared real war powers as support for 
the deployment. 
116. Id. at 23-24. 
117. "After Chadha, some Members of Congress introduced legislation to change the 
War Powers Resolution, which contains a provision that allows Congress to pass a 
concurrent resolution to order the President to withdraw troops engaged in combat. These 
lawmakers suggested that the concurrent resolution be replaced by a joint resolution of 
disapproval. As finally enacted, however, the procedure for a joint resolution was not added 
to the War Powers Resolution. It became a freestanding legislative procedure that is 
available to force a vote to order the withdrawal of troops." Louis Fisher, Legislative Vetoes 
after Chadha (Cong. Res. Service RS22l32), May 2, 2005, at 2 (internal citations omitted). 
See also 50 U.S.C. § I 546(a) (the "freestanding legislative procedure allowing a vote on 
withdrawal of troops"). The Fisher memo does distinguish between committee-level veto 
mechanisms, which have continued, and those at the level of one- and two-chamber action 
(i.e., concurrent resolution mechanisms), which have not. 
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The Kosovo activity mattered even more, as the United States 
employed a massive and economically devastating bombing campaign -
very much a war. Early on, the Senate passed a resolution stating that the 
President was authorized to conduct air strikes in the region. The House 
voted against American combat "ground elements," although none were 
contemplated. Most interestingly, the House considered a resolution 
expressly pursuant to Section S(c) to withdraw all armed forces from the 
• 118 b d' d 119 operatIOns, ut vote It own. 
A reader could review this record and see only that the chambers had 
acted inconsistently, or had not followed the WPR provision for a 
Congressional concurrent resolution for withdrawal from hostilities, or the 
President had not shown clear submission to the WPR requirement to 
withdraw from hostilities when Congress so orders. Those who can think 
functionally about the point of a congressional role do not lose faith at the 
messiness of the operation in action. There is little reason to think that the 
House of Commons under the Stuart monarchs, or the colonial legislatures 
under English governors, acted strictly according to formalists' rules, either. 
A shared power means the political branches may work matters out by 
rough-hewn methods. 120 
The votes in Congress about whether to authorize commitments to 
hostilities in Kosovo showed that the Congress had debated the issue and 
paid it much attention. Had the House and Senate possessed a 
determination to block the war action, they had the opportunities to do so. 
Particularly, the House's opportunity did not come from general legislation 
or general appropriation channels, but specifically from Section S(c). This 
provides all the more reason to consider such a mechanism to be a 
legitimate part of the sharing of war powers. 
2. Iraq Votes 
The congressional votes with respect to Iraq do not present the same 
picture as the Kosovo and Libya matters. These Iraq votes took place 
specifically in the context of enacting defense spending bills, rather than as 
separate expressions of congressional positions as in Kosovo and Libya. 
118. Removal of United States Armed Forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
H.R. Con. Res. 82, 106th Congo (1999). 
119. See, e.g., Gerald G. Howard, Combat in Kosovo: Ignoring the War Powers 
Resolution, 38 Hous. L. REV 261,285-287 (2001); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Legislating Clear-
Statement Regimes in National-Security Law, 43 GA. L. REv. 1059, 1078-1079 (2009); 
Michael Mandel, Note, A License To Kill: America's Balance of War Powers and the Flaws 
of the War Powers Resolution, 7 CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'y & ETHICS J. 785, 802-803 (2009). 
120. Cf 145 CONGo REC. H2456-03 (1999) (statement of Rep. David Obey) ("Over the 
last month this Congress could not have been more irresponsible in the way it has dealt with 
the issue in Kosovo if it had taken lessons .... Never, never in the 30 years that I have served 
here have I seen less vision. Never have I seen less leadership. Never have I seen more 
confusion."). 
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Nevertheless, they deserve attention, as significant congressional action 
with respect to the other long war, besides Afghanistan, since 9111 - the 
Iraq war. 
In the 2006 congressional elections, control of both the House and 
Senate shifted from Republican to Democratic, attributed among other 
reasons to disaffection with the Iraq war. Yet in January 2007, President 
Bush announced a military buildup in Iraq of 20,000 additional ground 
troops, known as "the surge." Congressional leaders announced they would 
seek a funding bill with a withdrawal schedule; President Bush said he 
would veto any bill with a timetable for withdrawal. As a commentator put 
it, "[t]his set the stage for a constitutional confrontation of the highest 
magnitude.,,121 On April 25, the House passed an appropriations bill with a 
timetable for withdrawal and the next day the Senate passed the same bill. III 
On May 1, President Bush vetoed it, and an override attempt fai1ed. 123 
Congress passed, and the President signed, an appropriations bill a month 
later,124 which required independent assessments of the Iraqi government 
and military forces. Some described the new benchmarks as token 
restrictions, while others said a serious review of the war could be forced 
that way.125 
One straightforward reading of the Iraq votes is that they provide no 
support for the legitimacy of a concurrent resolution mechanism. Congress 
in 2007 had the votes for a concurrent resolution, but it instead put its faith 
into moving a withdrawal schedule as an appropriation condition. When 
President Bush vetoed this, he showed that the House and Senate could not 
succeed on their own in forcing a President to change his war effort. 
The 2007 situation was not a typical or universal one. Congress had 
authorized the Iraq War in 2002. 126 It may be noted that Section 5(c) of the 
War Powers Resolution only provides for termination of hostilities by 
concurrent resolution when Congress has not authorized them. 127 There 
121. David L. Larson, The Constitution and U.S. Foreign Policy: The President, the 
Congress, and the People, 32 FLETCHER F. WORLD. AFF. 143, 152-154 (2008). This section 
on Iraq draws considerably on this piece. 
122. Carl Hulse, Senate Passes Bill Seeking Iraq Exit; Veto is Expected, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 27, 2007, at AI; Carl Hulse & Jeff Zeleny, House Approves War Spending Measure 
that Requires U.S. To Stan Pullout/rom Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at A12. 
123. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Zeleny, Bush Vetoes Bill Tying Iraq Funds to Exit 
Schedule, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007, at AI; Edward Wong & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Draft 
Oil Bill Stirs Opposition/rom Iraqi Blocs, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007, at AI. 
124. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007). 
125. Carl Hulse, Congress Passes War Funds Bill, Ending Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, May 
25,2007, at AI. 
126. Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 
Stat. 1498 (2002) [hereinafter Iraq Resolution]. 
127. See 50 U.S.C. §1544(c). 
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may be more room for congressional-presidential interplay in a conflict that 
Congress never authorized. 
Second, President Bush was dead-set on continuing the Iraq War 
without withdrawal, putting this above all other considerations. He would 
not accept any congressional communication short of an appropriation law, 
passed over his veto, cutting off the money for the war, and it is by no 
means clear what he would have done in the face even of such a cut-off. 
Not all Presidents approach all issues of war powers in such an absolutist 
way. As seen above in Kosovo, and in the next section about Libya, a 
dialogue may occur in which the Congress's priority is to avoid 
commitments of ground troops while the President's priority is to conduct 
an air operation. Congress receives more respect for its role in war powers 
- such as its actions in enacting and in employing a concurrent resolution 
mechanism - from a President who has flexibility in his plans. 
3. Libya 
Looking back at the successful ousting of Muammar Gadhafi in 2011, 
history may well play down the contemporary controversial nature of 
American military involvement. As part of a NATO operation with the 
stated goal of protecting Libyan civilians, the American military launched a 
series of sixty or so missile strikes against the Gadhafi regime. There was 
little danger of American casualties, but the strikes had strategic 
significance because of the superior American military capability to 
suppress Libyan air defenses and thereby make way for the rest of NATO's 
air operations. 
President Obama approved the operation without consultation with 
Congress - it was in recess and he was on a mission in Brazil. This 
produced one prominent legal controversy not relevant to this article - the 
legal view put forth by the State Department Legal Adviser, Harold H. 
Koh,128 that the operation did not constitute "hostilities" subject to the War 
Powers Resolution's ninety-day clock.129 A different controversy does 
relate to this article. Congress did have votes with respect to U.S. military 
operations in Libya. On June 24, 2011, the House rejected, 123-295, a 
resolution to support the mission. 130 However, the House also defeated, 
180-238, a bill to prohibit money for activities such as missile strikes. 131 
128. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations (June 
28, 2011) (testimony of Harold Koh), available at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/ 
imolmedialdoclKoh_ Testimony. pdf. 
129. For background on this issue, see WHITE HOUSE REPORT, UNITED STATES 
ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA (June 15, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com!wp-
srv/politics/documents/united-states-activities-libya.htmI. 
130. H.R.J. Res. 68, 112th Congo (2011). 
131. H.R. 2278, 112th Congo (2011); Jennifer Steinhauer, House Rebuffs Libya 
Mission; No Funds Cut, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at AI. 
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Later, on July 7, the House turned back, 199-229, an amendment that would 
prohibit funds for the U.S. military operation in Libya. 132 However, the 
House did adopt, 225-201, an amendment to bar funding for training or 
equipping the Libyan opposition.133 
Observers recognized that the 2011 Libya pattern resembled the 1999 
Kosovo pattern. As Congressional Quarterly observed in 2011, "Congress 
witnessed [this] sort of heated debate in 1999, when [President] Clinton 
notified but did not seek authorization from Congress about his order for 
U.S. military participation in NATO airs trikes in Kosovo to prevent ethnic 
cleansing. "That move set off a flurry of votes on measures both backing 
and opposing the engagement."I34 
As at other tests of authorization of military action, it could be urged to 
blow off these steps - or decisions not to take steps - by one or both 
chambers of Congress as without significance for constitutional war 
powers. On this way of thinking, the President decided what to do, and 
absent something like an enactment, or an appropriation condition about 
hostilities, Congress could not and did not take any step with effect upon 
his war powers. However, there is a better way of looking at it: the 
congressional votes marked off an area within which the President might 
have discretion, while making his position shaky if he strayed far beyond 
that area. Congress's signals could be read as saying something like: 
President Obama could have his initial series of missile strikes, but he was 
well-advised after that to turn the leadership over to other NATO nations, 
even for air operations. Moreover, he should not participate in any NATO 
effort to provide training or equipping of Libyan opposition forces, 
regardless of any humanitarian objectives. 
D. Ways of Understanding Congressional Mechanisms 
On one level, it suffices to show the history of concurrent resolution 
mechanisms leading up to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution; that 
Chadha dealt with strict domestic delegations of administrative authority 
and not something as flexible as the concurrent war powers of the Congress 
and the President; and, the record of actions by one or both chambers 
(without full legislation signed by the President) such as with Kosovo and 
Libya. Still, on another level, the subject calls for setting forth an 
132. H.R. Arndt. 543, 112th Congo (2011). 
133. H.R. Arndt. 542, 112th Congo (2011); Alexander C. Hart & Emily Cadei, With 
Pro-Obama Libya Measure on Hold in Senate, House Weighs In, CONGo Q. WKLY., July 9, 
2011,2011 WLNR 14228696. 
134. Emily Cadei, As Libya Rebellion Stalls, Congress Mulls Its Role, CONGo Q. WKLY., 
April 23, 2011, 2011 WLNR 8429195. 
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alternative conceptual understanding about why such a mechanism has 
legitimacy. 
It was notable that situations as remote in time from each other as 
Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011, with so much happening between them 
in terms of the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, had some similar lessons 
about the congressional role in war powers. It was a pattern in which the 
process of congressional votes was not the adoption of legislation with 
prohibitions, or appropriations conditions. Rather, activity by one or both 
chambers of Congress had significance, quite properly, because that 
allowed more democratic legitimacy into war powers. 
The challenge was to find conceptual ways to understand how 
congressional votes might have legitimate war powers significance, say, as 
the way Congress might allow a drawdown in Afghanistan subject to a 
bicameral resolution to stop the drawdown if the situation seemed to require 
this. 
One way consists of the impact of Congressional decision-voting on 
Presidential position-taking. Very simply, when the President pledges that 
he will abide by a decision of the House and Senate, he agrees to share war 
powers. A formalist would argue that this is just politics, like any other 
way to accord the House and Senate a role. Yet, the context for this is not 
like the context of a presidential pledge to an interest group. It has more 
than political significance because the House and Senate are more than just 
political entities. The Constitution gives them a concurrent role in war 
powers, a role that is flexible, and a presidential pledge fits with that. 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, the more recent follow-on from 
Youngstown, illustrates this. As the Court explains: 
[F]ailure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, 
especially in the areas of foreign policy and national security, imply 
congressional disapproval of action taken by the Executive. On the 
contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question 
of the President's authority in a particular case which evinces 
legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be 
considered to invite measures on independent presidential 
responsibility. 135 
Congressional inaction results from what one or both Houses do, without 
presidential signature or enactment, in contrast to putting in the Statutes at 
Large a new appropriation law or other legislation. A focus on 
congressional inaction in wartime has figured prominently in the Supreme 
135. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); 
see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: 
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1306 (1988) (arguing that after Dames 
& Moore, "a court may construe congressional inaction or legislation in a related area as 
implicit approval for a challenged executive action" (emphasis added)). 
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Court decisions of the past decade on war-related issues. As Professor 
Howell has noted, "the Justices [have] made much of the fact that the 
President lack legislative authorization for his wartime directive [as in Ex 
parte Milligan] or that he acted contrary to the will of Congress 
(Youngstown)." 136 So Dames & Moore provides a way of conceptualizing a 
role in issues of authorizing presidential war powers of what one or both 
chambers do, even without legislation as action or inaction affecting 
presidential authority. 
A second way is that both the Congress and the President could look at 
a concurrent resolution as the ultimate of all harbingers of a next step soon 
by appropriations. In other words, the President could view a concurrent 
resolution to stop a drawdown as a harbinger which the next appropriation 
law would follow by a condition stopping funds for the drawdown. To take 
a specific example, as to the Bosnia commitment in 1994, the steps by 
Congress in December 1995 arguably had legal significance. The steps 
occurred against the background that President Clinton could have, or not 
have, good-faith expectations about provisions in the next supplemental 
appropriations law. '3? 
If the House and Senate had voted against the Bosnia commitment, 
even though they did not enact a prohibition by a bill sent to the President 
for signature, he could not gone ahead with a good-faith expectation of a 
favorable next step in the next supplemental. '38 Because the Senate and 
House voted favorably to him, he could, and did, go ahead. The machinery 
of defense appropriations proceeds very much on the expectation of 
imminent congressional enactments of funding laws that could be 
affirmative about the next steps.139 
136. William G. Howell, Wartime Judgments of Presidential Power: Striking Down But 
Not Back, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1778, 1811 (2009) (footnotes omitted); see Ex parte Milligan, 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866) (noting lack of congressional authorization for military 
commissions to try civilians during the Civil War); but see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739, 
792 (2008) (holding that military commissions, despite explicit congressional authorization, 
effected unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus). 
137. Cf Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971). 
138. For example, the appropriations for 1984 limited aid to the Contras to a low rate, 
which "would require the Administration to soon ask Congress for more, thus keeping the 
Administration's policy on a very short leash." Hayes, supra note 74, at 1567. From 
Congress's condemnatory reaction after public disclosure of the mining of the Nicaraguan 
harbors, id. at 1567-1568, it was obvious that the Administration could not have any good-
faith belief thereafter that Congress would ratify its drawing upon funds when the 1984 limit 
was reached. That funding shortage led to the search for alternative funding sources that 
became the Iran-Contra affair. 
139. This theory explains that under some circumstances Presidents can legitimately 
take military actions not previously authorized by Congress, in the good-faith expectation 
that Congress will soon legislatively approve the action retroactively. In fact, there are 
powerful examples of the confirmation theory in operation. Authorizing legislation, after the 
fact of war powers exercise, is well established in Supreme Court case law, and Congress's 
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For another example, as noted, the House and Senate votes on Kosovo 
could be viewed, although not producing an enacted law, as marking that 
President Clinton could conduct air operations but not ground operations. 
The Office of Legal Counsel produced an important, but often overlooked, 
memorandum construing a 1999 supplemental appropriation as 
authorization for the Kosovo action. l40 The opinion noted and respected the 
House vote against ground troops. It said: "In reaching this conclusion 
[about the authorization of air operations], we need not and do not decide 
that the appropriation authorized ... the introduction of United States 
Forces onto the ground in Serbia or Kosovo. Interpretation of [the 
supplemental appropriation] must take into account the House of 
Representatives' vote on April 28 to block funding for ground troops ... ,,141 
The nature of war powers presents a situational mix of authorizing and 
non-authorizing aspects. The Afghan war evolved greatly in the decade 
after 2001. It started as a war against an enemy sovereign. It might have 
ended soon with the thorough defeat of that enemy sovereign, especially 
with a replacement government. But that insurgency, being too much 
neglected during the Bush administration, took deep root. 
As presented in the early-to-mid 201Os, the war had entered its second 
decade, now cast as a long-term counterinsurgency. If the President sought, 
and the Congress supported, a drawdown but only with a concurrent 
resolution mechanism to stop it, they would use their shared war powers in 
a way the Framers would have approved. But the constitutional analysis 
about how Congress and the President might make such decisions cannot 
retreat, by formalist simplicity, from detailed analysis of such decisions. 
The mechanisms that the elected branches may establish for such decisions 
deserve scholarly acceptance. 
CONCLUSION 
Does this article point to yet another respect in which war powers law 
and national security law have entered a new situation since 9/11 ?142 
Try this way of looking at it. From the War Powers Resolution, 
enacted in 1974, until 9/11, the United States had no long wars. It most 
certainly had very real wars. It had the Persian Gulf War, a very real war, 
in terms of casualties, stakes, cost, forces on each side, and so on. It had the 
enactment of appropriations for the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it has 
been argued, constituted confirmation for the expansion of that war. Orlando, 443 F.2d at 
1042; Ely, supra note 34, at 27-30. 
140. Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, Op. O.L.C., 2000 WL 
33716980 (Dec. 19,2000). 
141. ld at *23. n.40. 
142. For the kind of treatment suggested here, see Christopher A. Ford, War Powers As 
We Live Them: Congressional-Executive Bargaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers 
Resolution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609 (1995). 
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bombing campaign in Kosovo, which certainly had, for the other side, 
casualties, and for our side, massive use of the air forces although without 
use of ground forces. Thus, the United States had real wars, but it did not 
have long wars, with both the Persian Gulf and Kosovo wars ending in a 
couple of months. 
Hence, the landscape of war powers law in that period 1974-2001 kept 
at the forefront the kind of issues bequeathed by the Vietnam era, but not 
exactly the kind of issues that have arisen in the long wars of late. That 
1974-2001 period started, following the Vietnam War, with a strong 
retrospective national look at how the war in Indochina had been so 
wrongly initiated. The War Powers Resolution came out of concern that 
another President would again make a unilateral war commitment like 
Vietnam, with Congress unable to deal itself in at the beginning. 143 
Then, starting with 9111, and joined soon by the Iraq war vote in 2002 
and intervention in 2003, suddenly the United States had what turned out to 
be two wars - two bloody, costly ground wars. And, not just two wars, but 
two wars such as the United States had not conducted in 1974-2001: long 
wars. Some of the issues from 1974-2001 continue. Yet, in the past 
decade, war powers law and national security law have increasingly 
addressed the issues not found in those initial stages of wars or in short 
wars, as in the era of 1974-2001, but rather, these new issues as to the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Issues have come to the fore about different kinds of congressional 
input over time; about whether drawdowns can be worked out between the 
branches; about congressional mechanisms for compromising with a 
President; and, so on. These are issues of long wars, and this is an article 
about long wars. 
These kinds of issues suggest a need for suppleness, rather than 
reasoning built on old patterns or formal grounds. Flexible concerns 
suffuse the world of long wars. 
Historical background always helps a great deal, as it has here. This 
article and the other two in the author's trilogy depend upon the rich vein of 
historical insight in the work of Professors Barron and Lederman, and 
Professors Lobel and Prakash. 
Their history raises the right kinds of questions. Of course great 
Presidents facing great crises from Washington to Lincoln to Franklin 
Roosevelt acted flexibly, without taking their signals from some rigidly-
defined-in-law office. However, the answers they worked out live on as 
143. The biggest clash over war powers, combined with separation of powers, in the era 
of 1974-2001, may well have been the one about the Boland Amendments in the 1980s, 
precisely because it again seemed, as in Vietnam, that the President might make a unilateral 
war commitment (against Nicaragua) without a real congressional authorization at the 
beginning. 
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precedents, to suggest and to illuminate. As for this article's discussion, it 
draws on how President Franklin Roosevelt went with dozens of post-
enactment mechanisms to get through World War II. Congress imposed 
one on President Nixon, in the War Powers Resolution, in reaction to the 
experience of presidential dragging-on of a long war. 
Suppleness does not involve embracing every innovation that comes 
along. President George Bush '44 wrote an unusual number of signing 
statements, and this innovation, by and large, received strong criticism from 
a constitutional perspective. Many other unilateral innovations also 
occurred, some unwelcome. '45 The reader is merely invited to accept the 
invitation to think with suppleness of war powers in terms of the flexibility 
of the real world. 
144. Most readers will assume this is a reference to President George W. Bush of 2001-
2008. To be sure, it would be most true of him. However, it was also somewhat true of 
President George H.W. Bush of 1989-1992. Tiefer, supra note 74, at 31-60. 
145. In 2002, President Bush went beyond merely declining to submit the Rome Treaty 
on the International Criminal Court to the Senate for its approval. He took an unprecedented 
step of "withdrawing" significance from the previous signature on it - a previous signature 
which did not approve it unless and until the Senate did so - a step dubbed by the press the 
"unsigning" of the instrument. 
